The critical invariant: Avant-garde and change by Altintzoglou, Evripidis
  1 
The critical invariant: Avant-garde and change 
Dr Euripides Altintzoglou,  
Course Leader (Photography), Senior Lecturer (Fine Art), Wolverhampton School 
of Art, University of Wolverhampton 
 
Abstract 
‘Change’ is the locus of the avant-garde’s revolutionary character. Historical claims and 
contemporary theorizations of the avant-garde enforce methodological distinctions between radical 
and conforming attitudes that fluctuate according to existing political agendas. This process of 
instrumentalization renders the avant-garde susceptible to the conformity of institutionalization. More 
importantly it prescribes the avant-garde with a subservient role that controls its operational means 
and deflates its capacity to produce politics. What is to be done, if the avant-garde achieves its goal 
for socio-political change? Are we to abandon the spirit of critical reflection and surrender to the 
conditions of the next system? How can there be an avant-garde after capitalism if its ends are solely 
confined in the substitution of one system with another? This article traces out this problem, assessing 
what kind of emancipatory potential we might expect, or hope for, from a post-capitalist avant-garde, 
by advancing a critical examination of recent theories of political subjectivity, the dialectics of change 
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They are the guardians of the future and they are inventing the future. (Badiou 2010: 63) 
 
 Throughout modernism various avant-garde movements have subscribed to antithetical 
political ideologies: from the fascism of Futurism and the socialism of Constructivism, to the 
entrepreneurial individualism of Abstract Expressionism. More recently, historical and 
methodological distinctions between radical and conservative variations have identified the 
revolutionary character of the avant-garde as its driving force for change. In the preface to Peter 
Bürger’s seminal work on the avant-garde Jochen Schulte-Sasse (1984: xl–xlvii) raises an important 
question on the fate of radical art after it achieves its would-be goal – the sublation of art into society. 
We can expand this concern on the ways by which the association of the avant-garde with existing 
specific political agendas can render it susceptible to the instrumental conformity of 
institutionalization, and, thus, deflate its emancipatory potential.  
 There have been numerous instances of resistance towards the political institutionalization of 
avant-garde movements. The ‘Proletariat Art Manifesto’ published in March 1923 fought for avant-
garde autonomy. The manifesto was signed by Dada and Constructivist artists (Theo van Doesburg, 
Tristan Tzara, Kurt Schwitters, Jan Arp), who, although sympathetic to socialist politics, objected to 
the interventions of Russian and other Communist parties in cultural matters. In line with the pan-
European regress to classicism after the First World War the fascist and communist incorporation of 
once radical movements led to a reactionary return to tradition and ideological instrumentalization 
(Roberts 2015: 197). The reason why institutionalized praxis is detrimental to critical forms of 
cultural production is not only due to the loss of autonomy but precisely because heteronomy is 
susceptible to political instrumentalization. A system’s survival is inherently opposed to radical 
change as this unavoidably involves its eventual demise. Once heteronomy substitutes autonomy, the 
  3 
avant-garde spirit of progress in the pursuit of the new is employed for sustaining a system through 
minor forms of corrective improvement that disguise its ideological conservatism. 
 On the other hand, if avant-garde movements become exclusively dedicated to specific 
political agendas, their potential for perpetual change risks becoming obsolete. What is to be done 
once a socio-political change takes place? Are we to abandon the spirit of critical reflection and 
surrender art’s autonomy? What kind of emancipatory potential can we expect, or hope, to be 
advanced from a post-capitalist avant-garde? How can there be an avant-garde after capitalism, for 
instance, if its ends are solely confined to the supersession of this specific system? To paraphrase 
Marx, how can we keep changing the world? The demise of radical art (e.g. Futurism) under fascist 
and communist regimes has taught us that for the avant-grade to remain epistemologically viable 
through a constant retroactive approach to contemporary conditions it needs to sustain an open-ended 
research programme. Thus, it should not be solely bound in a struggle against the conditions of 
modernism, i.e., capital, and by extension capitalism and neo-liberalism. By perceiving the avant-
garde exclusively as a response to capitalism we contain its raison d’être solely within teleological 
anti-capital manifestations. For the avant-garde to remain poly-political it must retain a meta-political 
approach. That is, in order to be for politics, the avant-garde needs to advance a critical approach on 
the nature of politics. This methodological distinction should not be misinterpreted as inclusive of 
conservative programmes but as the condition that allows for the development of existing, or the 
emergence of new, emancipatory programmes. In our praise for the avant-garde’s political 
engagement, we have to understand that it alone cannot affect socio-political change. Rather, the 
avant-garde can be involved in change as the context that facilitates critical responses to the 
conditions of the present, based on the teachings of the past, for a better future.  
 Change is not synonymous with progress, hence why many prefer the safety and stability of 
the status quo. Change can also be quite a complex process that unfolds in variable degrees and ways. 
In most cases change is developmental and gradual, without excluding radical and transformative 
development. While on the one hand we can claim that all things change – in the purest of sense as 
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the effect of the passage of time, movement, etc. – there are some things that do not change – the 
universe, the broader realities of existence. Conversely, we could argue that in fact the above 
distinction is false and that, in reality, everything changes but at rates and scales that might go 
unnoticed. This is why we also have to distinguish between subjective and objective conditions of 
individual and social being and existence without, however, dismissing the dialectically causal 
connection between the two.  
 In political terms when we talk about change we tend to refer to a process that affects 
significant transformation, which may include progressive or regressive forms. Similarly, when we 
refer to the new we imply the emergence of radical systems that did not exist before. Such systems 
are often based on previously existing ideas, or Ideas, that develop into concrete political models. 
This is where Alain Badiou’s philosophical project on change becomes important. But instead of 
focusing on the contingency of the Event, I would rather problematize the phenomenology of Ideas. 
How, and out of which processes do Ideas emerge? To free political thinking from the metaphysics 
of Platonic philosophy we have to approach Ideas not just as pre-existing constants that we have 
merely to acknowledge and effectuate, but as the products of our socio-political responsibility. 
Otherwise, the conservatism of the classicist model leaves no room for the emergence of the new, 
cultural production (arts and philosophy). It is therefore quite obvious that this line of thought sustains 
the perils of hegemonic ideology; our containment within pre-existing systems renders us incapable 
of producing our own. 
 
 
An invariant drive for change  
  
 We often dismiss the possibility of critical cultural forms of production in pre-modern 
societies due to the artisanal conditions of production that have produced an incredibly censored 
version of history of art. State, religious and ruling class control of art production through 
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commissions puts in place a historical generalized exclusion of any kind of progressive, radical or 
challenging expressions that predate modernism and capitalism. Yet there are plenty of surviving 
examples of works that criticized, mocked and rejected the ideological dictates of the ruling class 
(Greco-Roman paintings on amphoras); appropriated religious patterns (late-Byzantine mosaics); 
comments on religious control of aesthetics (Renaissance rejection of medieval abstraction that 
advocated the spiritual aspect of being); helped emerging classes to claim their place through new 
forms of representation (seventeenth-century Dutch portraiture); and endorsed the critical reflection 
of the Enlightenment that subsequently laid the methodological foundations for the modernist avant-
garde. A historicist reflection of these moments might come to consider some as conservative or at 
the service of what we now perceive as wrong causes. The only thing that unites them is that each 
one ‘declared a formal break with preceding artistic schemata’ (Badiou 2008a: 132), a distinction that 
Alain Badiou applies to all avant-garde movements of the twentieth century, but certainly not limited 
to the modernist timeframe. As such, we can conceive of an invariant avant-garde as a mode of critical 
reflection on socio-political realities and injustices. 
 These overarching tactics, at the service of an everlasting desire for change, lay bare the 
gradual emergence of avant-garde tendencies before capitalism. Another common methodological 
characteristic of the avant-garde is the consistent rejection of dominant cultural modes of production 
that are often considered traditional (Badiou 2008a: 133–35). The endurance of the avant-garde ethos 
is similar to Badiou’s notion of a ‘communist invariant’ that encompasses all types of egalitarian 
struggle for equality:  
 
As a pure Idea of equality, the communist hypothesis has no doubt existed since the 
beginnings of the state. As soon as mass action opposes state coercion in the name of 
egalitarian justice, rudiments or fragments of the hypothesis start to appear. Popular revolts – 
the slaves led by Spartacus, the peasants led by Müntzer – might be identified as practical 
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examples of this ‘communist invariant’. With the French Revolution, the communist 
hypothesis then inaugurates the epoch of political modernity. (2008b: 35) 
 
Like the invariant communist struggle, the avant-garde aims at the common good but its only 
unchanging logic is change. Therefore, the production of the new is perpetually open-ended and 
adaptable. Despite methodological similarities, the communist hypothesis aims for change based on 
a specific political agenda while the avant-garde sustains a drive for variable change. This change is 
inclusive of, but not limited to, communist ideals. To paraphrase Badiou (2010: 63), the problem will 
never be resolved 1  because progress is sustained through a causal relationship of dealing with 
problems and no system is or can be perfect as that would automatically rule out the possibility of 
developmental progress. For Badiou the ultimate solution is located in the demise of capitalism and 
rise of communism. In many ways, the passionate drive for replacing capitalism with a communist 
alternative is forcing us to perceive the avant-garde solely as an instrument for the left, thus limiting 
its force for perpetual change and by extension its greater political capacity for generating new Ideas. 
We ought to look further than contemporaneous necessity. We need to learn from the Soviet past and 
acknowledge the dynamics of internal evolution that led to the demise of the state-communist project. 
More importantly, the dissolution of the Russian avant-garde in the state-communist project – its 
sublation to life – left cultural production without a critical voice that could resist the Stalinist 
appropriation of communism and the elimination of any alternative programme (Trotsky). No system 
– political, economic, artistic and otherwise – is immune to internal evolution and thus cannot guard 
against either its eventual demise or radical evolution. We are therefore faced with the realization that 
the political framework that follows a developmental process is not necessarily the last stage, despite 
its suitability to address a given set of invariable conditions. On the contrary, quite often there are 
reactionary retrogressive developments that take advantage of the need for social change and suppress 
progressive alternatives.  
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 There is a long history of egalitarian uprisings against oppressive and exploitative structures 
of ruling power. Many revolts advance a set of demands, but do not necessarily form concrete political 
agendas. In fact, such acts of resistance have the capacity to be the very events that generate 
revolutionary politics; violent ‘nights of the world’ before the dawns of new political subjectivity.2 
Lenin famously spoke of the distinction between political revolutions and class struggle, which he 
viewed as an inherent constituent of the middle class:  
 
For the theory of the class struggle was created not by Marx, but by the bourgeoisie before 
Marx, and, generally speaking, it is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. Those who recognise only 
the class struggle are not yet Marxists; they may be found to be still within the bounds of 
bourgeois thinking and bourgeois politics. (1973: 40)  
 
Along these lines, an attempt to claim the avant-garde solely for a single agenda is a contemporary 
mistake, analogous to Badiou’s attempt to claim all class struggle as communist. To quote Lenin 
(1973: 40) again: ‘to confine Marxism to the doctrine of class struggle means curtailing Marxism, 
distorting it, reducing it to something acceptable to the bourgeoisie’. Undoubtedly, the crisis of late-
capitalism is in dire need of the corrective criticisms of the left but to limit the avant-garde to a single 
type of struggle is to institutionalize and instrumentalize it, and thus prevent it from adapting to any 
other type of struggle that the future will demand. Also, as we will see further on, to reduce the avant-
garde to various defensive modes of struggle is the best tactic for suppressing its true nature of 
producing radical alternatives. 
 For Badiou, an event that initiates change is contingent, ‘purely hazardous, which cannot be 
inferred from the situation’ (2005: 193). If we consider change to be a matter of ‘a cast of dice’ and 
an ‘emblem of chance’ (2005: 193), then radical action and critical agency are nothing more than 
disorganized, indeterminate forms of pacifist anticipation of political Truths that originate in external, 
distant and disengaged Events. Change is not a matter of metaphysics or at the service of justifying 
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the righteousness of a greater cause through the adoption or imposition of pre-existing agendas. 
Rather, change is a continuous event occurring at variable rates and degrees of transformation. For 
the avant-garde to facilitate change it does not need to adopt but produce ideas pursued through 
adaptable methods and means. The emergence of the new requires an openness of methods, the kinds 
that can be found in the numerous and often disparate artistic movements. Progressive change and 
the new coexist in an interdependent dialectic way. Change is the ontological context within which 
the phenomenon of the new manifests.     
 Nicolas Bourriaud’s notion of the ‘radicant’ is primarily concerned with the emergence of a 
model of the new that involves a concurrent eradication of the old: ‘For there can be no radicality 
without an urgent desire for a new beginning, nor without a gesture of purification that assumes the 
status of a program’ (2009: 46). Bourriaud resorts to botanical metaphors to advance the concept of 
the ‘radicant’, in particular to the growth of ivy. He elaborates on how radicant plants ‘develop their 
roots as they advance, unlike the radicals, whose development is determined by their being anchored 
in a particular soil’ (Bourriaud 2009: 51). This parallelism might be useful for clarifying a distinction 
between origins and destinations, but it does hide a deeper set of negative connotations of dependency 
that are usually associated with parasitism. What is even more problematic with such organisms is 
that their existence relies on host plants, buildings or structures. Such existential reliance is 
detrimental to disengaged autonomy. The emergence of new systems and structures becomes 
practically impossible as this dependency restricts the formation of the new as a path freely taken 
strictly within the predetermined boundaries of an existing system. The radicant and its apparent 
independence is, in contrast, contained in the same way that late-capitalism incorporates non-
threatening expressions of radicalism to avoid greater eruptions resulting from a total suppression of 
criticism.  
 A discussion on paths brings to mind Heraclitus’ sayings on the notion of change as infinite 
flux – ‘everything flows’ – that drew its analogies from the ever-changing waters of a river. According 
to Bourriaud’s logic a ‘radical’ river would only flow within its existing banks. The river waters will 
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never be same at any given time but its activity will be contained within the limits of its banks. A 
‘radicant’ river, on the other hand, would be similar to a stream embarking on its virgin voyage, 
setting a path and creating its own banks as it goes. While the river is an established system that 
accommodates change within it, the virgin stream produces change at every step of its development. 
Both river and stream need the context of activity: they need the earth upon which they flow. For the 
river its banks will become a sub-context, or a system, within the broader context of nature and earth. 
A virgin stream’s flow, on the other hand, creates its own banks, a system within which it will grow 
into a river. The relationship between context and transformation is an important one for Badiou's 
concept of change, which, like Heraclitus’ ‘stream' and Bourriaud’s ‘radicant’, is driven by an 
empirical phenomenology brilliantly simplified in Paulo Freire’s ‘we make the road by walking it’ 
(Horton and Freire 1990). 
 The radical invariant might pose as an attractive model, but we need to defend ourselves 
against a mode of criticism that is void of any progressive intentions in relation to the avant-garde. In 
this respect the role of the path is important as it carries the potential of leading out of a system and, 
by doing so, into another. The avant-garde is not intent on simply leading us into systems already laid 
down for us, or to over-emphasize contained freedom as sufficient independence. The avant-garde 
explores the ways by which we can collectively engage with the emergence of the new and reveals 
how the illusion of freedom drawn from the temporary satisfaction of choice between existing options 
can be detrimental to the initiation of new alternatives. Navigating within existing conditions and 
systems keeps us in a state of defensiveness and mostly preoccupied with finding merely corrective 
solutions to problems. This exhausts the inventive potential of the avant-garde by deflecting attention 
from the source of the problem that is located in the systemic context: the banks of the river, not the 
flow within it. 
  
 
Dialectic change  
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 The avant-garde is driven by change, pursued through experimental and radical methods. 
Change can be both corrective and developmental (internal to existing conditions), and substantial 
(radical departure from existing structures). Badiou refers to these two types of change as ‘regular’ 
and ‘singular’. Regular change is ‘completely inside the laws of the world’, operating in corrective 
ways, and singular change ‘or an Event, is something like an immanent exception inside the of the 
world’, precisely due to its radical nature (Badiou 2013: 73). The context within which change takes 
place is divided between objective and subjective particulars, that is, between the physicality of the 
world (universe and earth) and the human activity within it:  
 
The simplest concept of the world is a collection of multiplicities with an order, and the 
particularity of the world is rather the particularity of the order of the order, or of the structure 
of the order […] the definition of the world is the effect on multiplicity by the structure of the 
world itself. (Badiou 2013: 75) 
 
When often we talk about changing the world we usually refer to the human conditions of existence: 
who we are and what we do, the ideological nature of socio-political systems and its affects. 
 For Badiou a ‘set’, in a Cantorian sense, is the context within which change takes place. A 
political system in not a set; rather it is the framework that regulates the set:  
 
We must insist on the point that change is not directly a question of sets in the universe, rather 
it is a question of the relations between sets. Change is always a change of some relation and 
not a change of the set itself. There is no change of the set itself. A set is what it is and cannot 
change, but the relation between two differences can change. We can affirm that we can have 
change in a world because we have relationships between differences in a world. (Badiou 
2013: 57) 
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Quite often when we talk about change we confuse the world – the physical context of change – with 
the system or the state – our world. Of course, we should not resort to a dualist disassociation of the 
two. Such an inverted distinction was the greatest capitalist fraud of the twentieth century: the 
erroneous conjunction of world and system and the misconception that followed, that to abandon or 
discard the system is to destroy the whole world. 
 The passion for progressive change should not reduce the importance of learning from the 
past and accommodating certain aspects that need to remain active in the new. The ‘new’ should arise 
from a critical interrogation of historical experience and be corrective of inequalities in social and 
individual discrimination, ecology and humanism, capital and wealth. Although progress might seem 
contrary to the dominance of tradition, for Badiou ‘tradition’ not only has a place in the process of 
change but it guarantees the permanence and continuity of corrective change (2013: 6–10). In this 
sense, tradition is not inherently oppressive. Rather, it brings to the fore the necessity of controlling 
the ethical and moral dimensions of ideologies that form long-standing social frameworks. Corrective 
change-as-tradition aims at a generic, universal application: all humans are equal, all sexes and races 
are equal, etc. It is another struggle, one that attempts to preserve a continuity for the emancipatory 
potential of Truths that have been pushed aside by the interests of the ruling elite. But for Badiou this 
notion of an existing universal struggle becoming tradition is an argument solely reserved for the 
Truth of the ‘communist invariant’, which in turn is an attempt to claim all egalitarian struggle under 
a single political agenda: all streams and rivers leading to one sea.3  
 To posthumously propose that all historical struggles, without a pre-existing defined 
programme, belong to this or that political orientation (left/right) is to attach a teleological fate to the 
invariant argument. For acts of protest to produce new Ideas that can potentially develop into concrete 
politics – i.e. egalitarianism to communism – they need to be allowed the self-definitional space to 
do so. Just because we can associate certain agendas or intentions of a struggle to an existing 
programme does not mean that its politics should be forcibly orientated towards it. If we were to 
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impose a specific agenda on protesters and rioters while they are actively engaged in a struggle, it is 
likely that we would influence the development of those politics within an existing ideology and thus 
prevent the emergence of the new. This is, in effect, instrumentalization through the back door. An 
egalitarian or an emancipatory invariant is not necessarily solely communist, even in the 
philosophical sense that Badiou is arguing. To use a historical example, this would imply that the 
Czechoslovakian and Polish revolts of the previous century would lead from communism to […] 
communism, albeit a better version of communism. But nevertheless, what is proposed is that all 
struggles for emancipation should lead to this end. Rather, the ‘new’ should incorporate the invariant 
ideals of the communist tradition that historical materialism has proven to be universally in need. 
Similarly, the new should not exclude the ideals found in variable political programmes that are truly 
emancipatory. More importantly, what should not be excluded is the possibility that new ideals may 
emerge as we adapt to the specificities of the future. The excluded should not exclude. 
 Corrective change that takes place within a system should be sustained over and beyond the 
system that it was introduced into. Universal values such as equality, freedom and all human rights 
are not context-dependent needs tied to specific historical and social conditions. They are universal 
values that should become traditions, in Badiou's sense, to endure political and systemic changes. 
Conversely, corrective and developmental tactics can over-emphasize the primacy of resistance, often 
trapping the emergence of the new in a futile pursuit of improving the present. Nevertheless, radical 
and substantial change cannot emerge outside a retroactively dialectical understanding of the past and 
a critical engagement with the present for a better future.4 These two tactics coexist in the avant-
garde’s dual critical interrogation of its phenomenological context and its ontological nature. There 
are certain perils with both types of change. Although radical change is fundamental, it risks 
becoming obsolete if it is substitutive rather than perpetual. On the other hand, developmental change 
is responsive, with small controlled adjustments that can prolong the longevity of the present. That 
is, once the process of the emergence of the new has been internalized by the system certain 
developmental changes can potentially suppress the emergence of radical change. 
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 Echoes of Plato’s Republic (1992) resonate in Badiou’s understanding of art and science as 
the only disciplines that can generate Truths, given their creative and innovative agency. However, 
this, is only possible through disengaged forms of critical practices – an artist’s studio, a scientist’ lab 
– which reinforce Badiou’s notion of Ideas generated outside of the broader context of everyday life. 
Bürger’s (1984) model of a disengaged, isolated critical approach resembles the essential 
characteristics of Cartesian subjectivity. Herein seemingly lies another dialectical conflict between a 
model of subjectivity that has its roots in a philosophy that rejects notions of multitude and mutability, 
and yet is employed by avant-garde artists and theorists as a methodology for change. In fact, this 
methodology shares a lot more with Montaigne’s reflections, in so far as they are advanced through 
a similar process of disengaged self-examination. In stark contrast to Descartes, Montaigne gradually 
recognized the inner instability of being and came to acknowledge the necessity of inherent change 
not only in human beings but also in all things. Unlike alienation, disengagement is voluntary and, 
among other things, it is a way of providing the author with a necessary critical distance. However, 
autonomy is causally dependent on heteronomy. We have to experience various sociocultural 
situations to critically reflect and act upon them.  
 The political and philosophical project of change is an act of negation5; thus we should accept 
systemic non-permanence as the only constant. Terry Eagleton identifies a very interesting paradox 
in relation to change and transformation. If change is radical ‘it might transform the very criteria by 
which we could identify it, thus making it unintelligible […] but if it is intelligible, it might be because 
the transformation was not radical enough’ (Eagleton 2003: 246). Accordingly, if we understand the 
logic of a specific change then it is possible that the change is not radical enough. But on the other 
hand, if it is truly radical, then we would fail to comprehend it. Eagleton’s strong reliance on 
continuity leads to certain problems: ‘change must presuppose continuity – a subject to whom the 
alteration occurs – if we are not to be left merely with two incommensurable states: but how can such 
continuity be compatible with revolutionary upheaval?’ (2003: 246). The problem in this view lies 
precisely in the understanding of change as a single-ended process with a predetermined aim. 
  14 
Continuity in change is twofold: externally it relates to the conditions that led to its manifestation and 
internally it is the ever-evolving mechanism that sustains its radical capacity even after a change has 
taken place. 
 Slavoj Žižek offers a Hegelian solution to this problem: ‘A true change sets its own standards: 
it can only be measured by criteria that result from it’ (2012: 520, emphasis added). But, if we 
perceive change as a never-ending process why do we need to ‘measure’ it? We could measure 
developmental change in terms of how things develop within a system. If the project of change is free 
from specific agendas, why do we need to verify that change has happened or to define its radicality? 
Such discussions around ‘measuring’ and ‘identifying’ expose an underlying desire for controlling 
the process and aims of change. If we employ change for a specific end – communism for capitalism 
or vice versa – then, like a party or a board of directors, we are compelled to manage the process of 
change and its results. Yet, the emancipatory potential of radical change often involves modes of 
unpredictability that contradict our overbearing desire for control. Change, therefore, oscillates 
between an endless struggle to revolutionize the current instrumental limitations of control and equip 





 It would be false to assume that tactics of institutionalization are only employed by 
capitalism. Italian and German variations of fascism and Soviet communism incorporated artistic and 
cultural radicalism in ways that served each political agenda. The avant-garde stands in existential 
connection to institutionalization, forcing the question of whether its radical potential would diminish 
in the absence of the need for resistance against conforming conditions. Recent theorizations of the 
Avant-Garde not only distance themselves for institutional critique but also allocate a crucial role to 
the institution, now perceived as an instrument for change. These forms of radicalizations of the 
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institution need to remain conscious of the issues that brought about institutional critique. For 
instance, Marc Leger’s call for the ‘egalitarian transformation of institutions’ (2012: 3) could still 
allow for institutions – both existing and emerging – to remain hegemonic if they are underwritten 
by aspirations of systemic control. Leger’s Lacanian ‘Sinthomeopathic’ 6  approach towards 
institutions risks restricting the avant-garde within a set of responsive tactics of systemic containment, 
despite its dialectic maturity. Similar to Leger, Gerald Raunig’s ‘instituent practices’ are models of 
actions and processes that do not ‘oppose the institution, but […] flee from institutionalization and 
structuralization’ (2009: xvii). Based on Antonio Negri’s (1999) non-dialectic concept of ‘constituent 
power’ the dynamic potential of alternative ‘instituting’ processes and events (Raunig 2009: 173–86) 
does indeed provide a supportive solace and a fostering environment for ‘coping and resisting today’s 
“societies of control”’ (Leger 2012: 89), which is precisely why they should contravene the 
teleological entrapment of hegemony. For emerging radical institutions to sustain ‘the process of 
constitution […] [so] that the revolution never ends’ (Negri 2003: 80) they would have to resist the 
temptation to exhaust their transformative potential for substitutive ends, a form of instituting without 
constituting. As such, their capacity to ‘[re]compose themselves as a constituent power again and 
again’ (Raunig 2009: 185) will not remain limited to repetitive cycles of responsive modes of 
resistance or types of struggle driven by defeatist aspirations for dominance, but engage in collective 
forms of political becoming. A critical proximity with institutions and their hegemonic nature is 
necessary for forming targeted modes of resistance. Conversely, institutionalization tempts the avant-
garde into corrective modes, permitting minor improvements and developments to avoid radical 
change. In this way, ruling systems not only diffuse the opportunity for change but also employ the 
innovative capacity of the avant-garde to sustain their dominance through controlled and introspective 
development.7 
Quite often, artists dedicated to a cause are referred to as heroes. The hero is a strong figure 
in Platonic philosophy and likewise in Badiou’s project:  
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Heroism is not a negative determination, it is a rational conviction that in some circumstances, 
but not always, we must act on behalf of an idea and not according to our pure interests. True 
heroism is rational, it is not a passion without determination. (2013: 62, emphasis added) 
 
This version of ‘heroism’ completely disregards the possibility of an artistic act or an Event producing 
a new Idea since the rejection of undetermined acts allows only for a devoted subservience to a pre-
existing Idea. Are political and cultural movements, thinkers and artists meant only to follow and 
advocate the Truths produced by pre-existing Events that originate outside such movements? 
Admittedly Badiou argues that artworks are Truths,8 but what could facilitate a determination in 
cultural forms of production towards the emergence of new Ideas?  
 Badiou insists on discussing change as an outcome of Events driven by a set of invariant Ideas 
that unite under political programmes. As such, the process of change itself cannot become an Event 
in its own right and produce an Idea, but rather it can only follow existing ones. This is a common 
position that insists that revolutionary change should follow existing concepts, leaving no room for 
the emergence of the new. The avant-garde is a cultural domain, a Situation, that facilitates the 
emergence of Events through the production of Ideas. Otherwise, autonomy is not employed in a 
neutral sense – necessary for the emergence of the new – but rather it becomes a manifestation of 
difference from the Other – the dominant framework – expressed exclusively though acts of negation. 
In other words, the avant-garde is reduced to a critical voice of alternative versions of existing 
programmes and, as such, is rendered incapable of accommodating a significant transformative ideal.  
To offer just a critical corrective perspective without producing Ideas is to employ only one 
half of the avant-garde’s potential. In his later work, Badiou considers the possibility of an Event to 
‘happen by change’ (2013: 61), and accordingly change needs an Idea to become a possibility, for a 
beginning – a revolution, a riot – to affect change and not die out without any effect. Could this 
requirement for the adoption of an existing Idea prevent future revolts from producing politics and 
thus even prevent them from happening? In other words, could the need for an Idea force radical 
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movements into a dilemma of either adopting an existing programme or postponing their 
revolutionary acts on the basis of a lack of a direction? There is an important distinction to be made 
here between core Ideas – such as emancipation, equality, civil rights – and political systems that are 
constituted by a set of such Ideas. Political systems, such as capitalism and communism, consist of 
some of these Ideas. A struggle can be fuelled by a core Idea, which is why it has the capacity to 
produce its own Truth, so that it can become an Event. When one of these Ideas affects corrective 
change within an existing system then we witness what Badiou calls ‘tradition’, when certain 
injustices are put right and reform the system from within. This institutionalization of the radical 
capacity for change, however, is precisely what diffuses the drive for a bigger change and sustains 
the existing system through evolutionary developments.  In the realm of cultural production, the 
avant-garde artist becomes such a Hero, driven by an Idea (i.e., emancipation, social justice) that 
could certainly be part of a broader set of Ideas that constitute political programmes (communism, 
fascism, capitalism). Of course, Badiou is aware of this distinction, which is why, in a Platonic sense, 
he designates communism as an ‘Idea’. What is consistently left out is the open possibility for artists 
to work on new Ideas through research and critical reflection. To exclude this capacity for the new is 
to impose a metaphysical distance between Ideas and us, albeit similar to the cosmological (Platonic) 
or theological (Judaeo-Christian) conceptions of our place in the world. It is precisely such a distance 
that allows for the manipulation of the social by hegemonic ideology: if Ideas are only to be followed, 
then one set can be instrumentally substituted by another to secure the dominance of a ruling system. 
 This transformation of Ideas into politics and the various mechanisms of institutionalization 
expose the avant-garde to the endangerment of internal methodological conformity as a form of 
immutable sets of methods and strategies. Surely, if the avant-garde aims at change, it should also be 
open to its own change through a constant reconstitution of its determinants. The various styles or 
movements that have spawned throughout early, late and postmodernism are a testament to the avant-
garde’s capacity to adapt to variable sociocultural conditions. However, the substitution of 
retroactivity with retrogression should not be misperceived as radical change. Indeed, the greatest 
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threat to progress derives from the entanglement of development in the vicious circles of retrogressive 
substitution: from capitalism to communism and back,9 from classicism to modernist abstraction and 
back.10 Badiou is right to state that ‘political repetition is the victory of the state (2013: 28). There are 
many historical examples of such instances: Maurice Denis’ essay ‘Definition of Neo-Traditions’, a 
spokesman for the ‘Nabi’ group (Pierre Bonnard, Édouard Vuillard, Félix Valloton), pleaded to avant-
garde artists in the 1890s to return to classicism. Only a few decades later and after the First World 
War, the French ‘call to order’ incorporated another return to pre-modern classicism. In politics, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent broad Russian endorsement of capitalism (a tendency 
also evident in recent Chinese market reforms) have put in place a binary dilemma between capitalism 
and communism, right or left. The avant-garde needs to lead the way forward and avoid an entrapment 
between right and left. As Hal Foster put it: ‘a postmodernism of resistance is concerned with a critical 
deconstruction of tradition, not a […] pastiche of pop- or pseudo-historical forms, [it is concerned] 
with a critique of origin, not a return to them’ (1983: xii). The avant-garde has to offer radical 
alternatives and not to endlessly ricochet between existing binary opposites. In this respect Bourriaud 
is right in arguing that ‘it is a matter of replacing the question of origin with that of destination’ (2009: 
40). 
 If social change is restricted to a specific outcome (art-in-life for the left [historical avant-
garde], co-optation with the market for the right [neo-avant-garde]) the avant-garde would become 
an instrument for imposing ideologies as opposed to resisting, correcting, redefining and facilitating 
the production of the Ideas that come to constitute the social domain. The avant-garde’s aim should 
be to sustain a reciprocal relationship with socio-political frameworks: to keep changing society 
through art, and, art through society. In this way there would be multiple ends, each one followed by 
a new beginning. For instance, Blake Stimson and Gregory Sholette’s (2007) advocacy of 
collectivism as a solution for the enhanced individualism of globalization restricts the avant-garde to 
a set of contemporary responses towards the current conditions of the dominant system. This type of 
existential reliance reconfigures the avant-garde purely as a set of corrective methods for the control 
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of the present, feeding on the illusion of a move towards the future. Or, to paraphrase Rosalind Krauss 
(1996: 84), we need to be aware of situations where culture is preparing us for the needs of a 
predefined future despite the somewhat perceived critical distance from the controlled development 
of the dominant system.  
 Before the adoption and support of relational and collaborative practices by major institutions, 
the spatial and topological expansion of post-conceptual art allowed for the eventual 
institutionalization of previously excluded spaces through the curatorial assimilation of public art and 
its endorsement by galleries and museums. When artists occupy a non-artistic space or when 
independent organizations base their activities in derelict or unused buildings with a previously strong 
systemic identity (i.e. Unity Square HQ of Athens Bienalle) we witness the mimicking of the 
mechanics of institutionalization of the very system that is under critique.11 This is the exact model 
that the Tate Modern followed by choosing a decommissioned power station and in doing so, that 
moment signified the end of the ‘expanded field’ and openly promoted the system’s capacity for 
diffusing radicalism through the seemingly incorporation of its critical lessons: if artists inhabit or 
work in neglected and impoverished urban areas, investment will follow and raise the land-value to 
the point that it eventually becomes prohibitively expensive for artists to live or practice. 
 Unlike the initiatory character of radical change, corrective and developmental strategies 
supervene upon and are derivative of a problematic situation. Their responsive method depends on 
the existence of a prior event, and therefore they manifest themselves within the confines of causal 
dependency. A subservient longing for acceptance or incorporation by the system is troubling in 
Sholette’s supposition that art will eventually merge with social life once capitalism ‘acknowledge[s] 
this missing mass [of various individual and collaborative practices operating in the periphery or 
outside the official economy of arts]’ by putting in place a ‘radical re-definition of the concept of 
productivity’ (in Cottington 2013: 123). Under neo-liberalism the avant-garde should not set out to 
simply change the consumerist dynamics of the market – i.e. to replace bourgeois dealers with artist-
run galleries – but to resolve the ideological pressures that diffuse the radical development of culture, 
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inclusive but not limited to art production. Similarly, the avant-garde should not exhaust its critical 
capacities by aiming solely at capitalism or any dominant system since this would distract its attention 
away from the system of politics itself. As such, an overarching cultural defence against the perils of 
institutionalization and a return to an oscillatory autonomy will refocus the avant-garde on politics 
and away from system-specific solutions such as praxis and the merging of art and social life.12 Herein 
lies another internal contradiction, that is, for the avant-garde to ‘defend’ itself it needs to ‘attack’. 
To lead a radical offensive that resists the momentary satisfaction of the reconfiguration of tradition, 
the avant-garde should not neglect the push towards the future by solely responding to the present.    
 
* * * 
 
 Corrective or developmental tactics sustain avant-garde practices as a set of critical responses 
towards the mechanics of a system, but they are also in danger of limiting their radical potential within 
it, and, in doing so, deflecting the avant-garde from the facilitation of new politics. Such forms of 
avant-garde are driven by the Truths of previous Events. We should also conceive avant-garde 
movements and artworks as cultural Situations that accommodate the generation of Ideas in their own 
right for new Events to follow with the production of Truths. But for this to happen we must allow 
for avant-garde practices a return to their roots: a production of Ideas, or in more simplistic and 
perhaps familiar terms, original concepts. The attempted containment of institutionalization only 
allows for what is essentially an imprint, a promise of an avant-garde within the restraints of 
capitalism or any other dominant ideology. If on the other hand the avant-garde is solely concerned 
with the emergence of new politics – in the form of new relations of production – it might abandon 
its critical stand towards present matters. We are, therefore, faced with a fundamentally dialectic 
practice: the future – i.e. the emergence of the radical new – cannot emerge without a critique of the 
present. It is precisely because of this critique of the present that we need to guard against the 
attritional effects of institutional conformity that suspends radical change. The momentary 
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satisfaction gained from corrective gains should not encourage a reliance on a parthenogenetic and 
contingent type of emergence of the new as this would be pacifist and politically irresponsible.13  
 This brings us back to the following question: what is to be done once capitalism or any other 
system is replaced by the new? The answer might not seem obvious: the avant-garde has to sustain 
its forms of resistance towards the hegemonic temptations of a present victory, which is necessary 
for facilitating the cultural conditions for the emergence of the future. But for the avant-garde to 
achieve this it has to also avoid the perils of repetition that exhaust its radical potential. Unlike the 
didactic character of institutionalized art, the avant-garde is epistemologically productive: it produces 
knowledge in a collaborative nexus defined and redefined by the ever-changing contextual conditions 
of the world. The avant-garde does not represent change to its viewers posthumously, but rather, it 
explores ways by which change is to be actively pursued, and as such it can produce Ideas that lead 
to Events: ‘An event is always the opening of a new possibility. It is not the realization of a possibility 
but the creation of a possibility’ (Badiou 2013: 28–29).  
 Instead of utilizing the avant-garde as another cultural context for enforcing change, we 
should employ it for its capacity to facilitate change. In this way the avant-garde has no end. Its main 
purpose is to maintain a politically responsible form of social agency against the ideological 
conformities of hegemonic tradition. This is why change should not be misinterpreted as a form of 
singular substitutive permanence or as the pursuit of the next state forever. Contrary to the agendas 
of specifics politics the avant-garde sustains its ideological autonomy through the multitude: an 
adaptive progressive stance towards variable situations and developments. Otherwise permanence is 
disguised as change. Change has no end. Change is perpetual. 
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1 ‘But it cannot be said that the problem has been resolved: what new forms of political organisation 
are needed to handle political antagonisms?’ (Badiou 2010: 63). 
2 I discuss the need for revolutions to produce their own politics in ‘Deflowered revolution: An 
ethical examination of neo-liberal tactics of pacification’ (Altintzoglou 2016: 23–32). 
3 ‘If truth is not a generic set, a truth is only particular, a truth is only appropriate to a specific part 
of humanity, and so a truth is not a truth’(Badiou 2013: 16). 
4 ‘An avant-garde group is one that decides upon a present – for the present of art has not been 
decided by the past, as the classicists content, but rather hampered by it’ (Badiou 2008a: 135). 
5 ‘A change is negation. We cannot think change without claiming that something is not as it was 
before’ (Badiou 2013: 38). 
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6 Leger defines the ‘Sinthomeopathic activity’ as ‘lending oneself to institutional arrangements, the 
symptoms of contemporary cultural production, while still maintaining the fantasy of critical 
distance’ (2012: 99). For Leger’s thorough account of the Lacanian ‘Sinthomeopathic’ model see 
‘Welcome to the cultural goodwill revolution: On class composition in the age of classes struggle’ 
(2012: 82–99). 
7 Thomas Crow talks of how the neo-avant-garde has been subsumed by capitalism by becoming 
the ‘research and development arm […] of the culture industry’ (1996: 35). 
8 ‘Aesthetics is the name of the relationship between philosophy, art, and history. And so it is not a 
creation of truth because it is the work of art itself which is the creation of truth’ (Badiou 2013: 67). 
9 ‘The (19th-century) movement and the (20th-century) party were specific modes of the communist 
hypothesis; it is no longer possible to return to them. Instead, after the negative experiences of the 
‘socialist’ states and the ambiguous lessons of the Cultural Revolution and May 68, our task is to 
bring the communist hypothesis into existence in another mode, to help it emerge within new forms 
of political experience. This is why our work is so complicated, so experimental’ (Badiou 2010: 37, 
emphasis added). 
10 Thomas Crow talks of how art history repeated itself in modernism: ‘Yes, it has to be conceded, 
low-cultural forms are time and again called upon to displace and estrange the deadening givens of 
accepted practice and residuum of these forms is visible in many works of modernist art’ (1996: 4). 
11 For a discussion around the similarities between contemporary art and neo-liberalism – 
‘pluralism’, ‘pragmatism’ and ‘relativism’ see Hal Foster, ‘The funeral is for the wrong corpse’ 
(2002: 123–43). 
12 The Greek origins of ‘praxis’ indicate simplistic forms of ‘making’, which suggests that 
production is subject to the commands of a commissioner with a specific agenda, and ‘politics’ is a 
responsible form of being within organized social structures expressed through creative autonomy. 
13 Similarly, Adorno forces radicalism in a state of hibernation by waiting for change and not 
initiating it (Schulte-Sasse 1984: xlii). 
